



Island of Othoni
The westernmost tip of Greece

Greek-Turkish negotiations

What we need to know



Island
The southernmost tip of
Greece

Gavdos



Megisti Island
The easternmost tip of Greece

Instead of a preface

"The Nation must learn to consider as national what is true".

Dionysios Solomos

Negotiations between Greece and Turkey have recently begun, with the aim of "resolving the differences" and normalising our relations.

"Even if the discussions are conducted by experts, there is a great lack of reliable information for the Greek people about what is at stake in these talks. The official reassuring statements of the Greek government are in direct contradiction to what the Turks claim and claim from most important lips. The issues of sovereignty and sovereign rights of Greece cannot be the subject of secret diplomacy.

According to Kyriakos Charalambides, the advice of a Swedish veteran diplomat to 'Greek Ambassador in Ankara were the following: *"three things to know about the Turks: First, the Turks lie all the time. First, the Turks always lie, they always lie. Third, they do not give up anything."*

Basic and accurate information on issues of national sovereignty is not only a basic obligation of a democratic state towards its people. It will also help us to understand the ongoing Greek-Turkish negotiations behind closed doors, and to appreciate how 'innocent' or dangerous the words of politicians and the media are about the homeland we will hand over to our children.



Neither a "blue" nor a "brown" homeland: The Turks, foreign invaders in the Greek East.

From the warlike tribes of semi-arid nomads living on the steppes of Mongolia, the Turks arrived in the Southeast less than 1,000 years ago, in two waves.

In the 8th century, the Oghuz Turks left Mongolia and arrived in what is now western Turkestan. The Seljuks, a sect of the Oghuz, flee further west and end up as mercenaries in Baghdad caliphates. There, contact with Persian and Arabic culture enriches their vocabulary, gives them Arabic script and, as a religion, Mohammedanism, without losing their warlike nomadic character.

The Seljuk tribes united under Alp Arslan, invaded Armenia and sacked its capital in 1064. A few years later, in 1071, at the Battle of Manzikert, they defeated the Byzantine army and conquered large areas of Asia Minor, establishing Seljuk emirates. **This is the first Turkish presence in Asia Minor.** The Byzantines and the Western Crusaders soon dismantled most of these Turkish emirates, leaving only one, with Iconium as its capital. This was called the **"Sultanate of the Rum", that is, the Romans**, the Eastern Roman Empire.

The Empire of the Empire as it was called what we now call Byzantium. This was the first wave of invasion.

The second wave of invasion starts about 800 years ago from Turkestan. Another tribe of Turks flee under the weight of the raids of the Mongol Genghis Khan and try to take over the homelands of the Armenians and Kurds in eastern Missia, who push them back. Crossing the Euphrates River, their leader Suleiman drowned, and the place where he was buried was called 'the grave of the Turk',

"Turk mezari", a **name that shows how foreign the Turks were in these areas.** His son, Ertogrul, continued the advance and they eventually settled in Ikonio, in the Sultanate of Rum. The grandson of the drowned Suleiman, Osman, became sultan and gave his name to the Turks, who were then called Osmanides, Ottomans.

The Romanosyne - the Orthodox Hellenism, according to the blessed Fr. George Metallino - resisted fiercely, but in 1453 it fell with the fall of Vassilieusa, ending history of **the longest autocracy that ever saw the light of** . For four centuries it suffered the relentless slavery of the Ottoman yoke, but it did not lose its self-consciousness, with the Orthodox faith as its first criterion and then the Greek language.

The Ottoman leaders quickly realised that they could not, as a minority population, rule over French conquered populations and at the same time wage more wars. Therefore, they devised and implemented "special measures". These were atrocities that the world had never known before, such as the mass Islamization of populations (who thus acquired a Turkish identity), the massacres of children for an army of genitsars (from Greeks and later other peoples), who grew up with the idea that they were the seed of the Sultan himself), the systematic slaughter and extermination of millions of indigenous Greeks and Armenians, as well as hundreds of thousands of Kurds, Syrians, Serbs and Bulgarians.

In their contact with Asia Minor and European populations, the Turks did not take on anything but the DNA of the conquered. Let's end the myth that our ethnic origin supposedly changed because of the Turks. This historical continuity of Hellenism is certified by the renowned anthropologist

Aris Poulianos, following systematic anthropological studies of ancient medieval and modern documents, which prove that the modern Hellenism of Asia Minor is the Asia Minor race of our ancient Pelopsagrian nation. We are not, then, "children of the Ottomans", as some of the religious zealots

government officials of the New Republic have dared indecently and unjustifiably to utter recently, but we are genuine children of the ancient Wise Men of Ionia, the Salaminomachi and the warriors of Issus, the Romans of the Basilisk City and the Saints of Cappadocia.

After countless revolutions, culminating in the great National Uprising of 1821, "through Christ the Holy Spirit and the freedom of the Fatherland", the Nation of the Romans liberated a first corner of its land. **The independent Greek state was the conscious successor to the Byzantine Empire.** As General Theodoros Kolokotronis said, "*The Genos never submitted to the Sultan. It always had King, its army, its castles. Its king was the Marble King. His army was the armorers and the thieves. His castles were Mani and Souli.*"

Many struggles followed for the liberation of the unforgotten homelands, but also for the preservation of Hellenism in its ancestral homes. The Macedonian struggle, the Balkan wars (1912-13), the struggles of the Pontic Hellenes and their genocide (1919), the Asia Minor war and its destruction (1922), the Cyprus conflict (1974) are some of the chapters of the Greek-Turkish conflict of the last two centuries.

Relations between Greece and Turkey from the Treaty of Lausanne to the present day

The Treaty of Lausanne (1923), in the aftermath of the Asia Minor disaster, set current starting point in the relations between Greece and Turkey. It defines the basic institutional framework governing the maritime borders, the national sovereignty and territorial status of the two countries, the status of the

Muslim minority in Thrace and the Greek minority in Istanbul, Imbros and Tenedos, which at that time numbered

130,000 , without ever taking into account, of course, the crypto-Christians of Asia Minor.

The once dynamic Greek element, from a social, economic and cultural point of view, was gradually reduced, uprooted and emigrated, due to systematic violations of the law and persecution by the Turkish state, culminating in the horrific and disgraced

explicitly in 1955 and the deportations of 1964. Today, they have

less than 3,500 souls of the official Greek minority remain in Turkey.


Since the early 1970s, when the existence of large oil deposits in the Aegean subsoil had become apparent, Turkey initiated a new systematic policy of challenges and claims against Greece's sovereign rights.



September 1955, the third fall of Constantinople. Dozens of murders, hundreds of rapes, destruction of thousands of Greek homes, shops, schools, hospitals, factories, burning of churches and desecration of graves. Hate for everything Greek.

D. The aim of this policy was, and continues to be, to change the territorial status quo, which is provided for by international treaties, with the Lausanne Peace Treaty as the central pillar, as well as the legal status in maritime and airspace, which derives from the International Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1982) and the Law of the Air (Chicago Convention 1944).

Former Turkish Prime Minister and academic Ahmet Davutoglu had written that "the *gathering*



of the Aegean islands in the hands of Greece creates the most important negative element for Turkey's policy ... and the political distribution of these islands is contrary to the geopolitical necessities that arise."

President Erdogan also stated in a speech in 2016 that "...in Lausanne, we gave up the Aegean islands. Those who took part in the talks did not manage to

rise to the occasion. Today we are experiencing the consequences of this weakness. We have handed over islands from which you can be heard across the sea."

For these reasons, Turkey is weaving a canvas of ever-increasing disputes and claims that have even brought the two countries to the brink of armed conflict on several occasions, as in August 1976 ("Hora"), March 1987 ("Sismik-1"), January 1996 (Imia), and most recently in July and November 2020 due to seismic surveys by the "Uruts Race" in the Greek continental shelf of the Eastern Mediterranean.



Imia, 31 January 1996. Greek officers Vlahakos, Karathanasis and Yalopsos sacrifice themselves defending the Greek flag, which Foreign Minister Pangalos said was taken by the wind, while Prime Minister Simitis thanked the UAE.

The objectives of Turkish foreign policy are clear and permanent, and are systematically expressed by many officials of both the government and the opposition:

- Questioning Greece's legal and sovereign right to extend its territorial waters in the Aegean beyond 6 nautical miles, as provided for by the Convention on the Law of the Sea, which since 1998 has been European law for all EU member states and which must be accepted by the candidate countries (such as Turkey).
- Questioning the extent of Greek national airspace, through continuous violations by Turkish warplanes.
- Questioning of maritime borders and Greek sovereignty over islands.
- Questioning of responsibilities within the Athens Flight Information Region (FIR), which Greece exercises on the basis of ICAO decisions, and continuous refusal to comply with air traffic rules (non-filing of flight plans).
- Questioning of the Greek competence for "Search and Rescue" in the Aegean, contrary to international practice, contrary to the recommendations of the IMO and ICAO, which advocate the adoption of a "search and rescue" policy.

This is in contradiction with the Chicago Convention (Annex 12) which recommends that search and rescue areas coincide with the boundaries of FIRs.

- Demand for demilitarization of the islands of the Eastern Aegean and the Dodecanese.
- Implementation of the "Blue Homeland" doctrine whereby the Turkish EEZ extends to half of the Aegean Sea, challenging the right of the Greek islands to have their own EEZ.
- Registration of the arbitrary name "Turkaegean" (2021) for the Greek Aegean, which was submitted to the competent European committee; this arbitrary name was unfortunately "duly considered" by the competent Greek Ministry, which did not submit any objections.

Turkey promotes these disputes, calling them "geopolitical necessities", "grey zones" and "special conditions in the Aegean". Its methods and practices are contrary to the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter: threat of war, violations of national airspace by armed fighter aircraft over populated areas, issuing illegal NOTAMs in the Aegean, etc.



direct threat of "Benito of " against the Greek Aegean.

Window of opportunity or planned negotiation?

The conflict in Ukraine, from February 2022, has become a geopolitical *bras-de-fer* between Russia and the EU, with the EU economies paying an extremely heavy cost.



Greece hastily and without a national plan aligned itself with the "right side of history", i.e. the US, coming to a major break with the traditionally friendly Russia. On the contrary, Turkey, once again, acted as the "demonstrative neutral". While belonging to the NATO, it does not apply the sanctions decided by the West, has its airports and ports open to Russia and of course

is taking every opportunity and cooperation on economic and military level with it. And while Greece was providing free arms to Ukraine, Turkey was selling its own.

In February 2023, after the devastating earthquakes in south-eastern Turkey, a supposed "window of opportunity" was created to resolve our differences, which in practice are unilateral demands by Turkey. There was even a brief push, involving politicians from all parties in power, to convince us of the need to negotiate with Turkey.

Tsipras spoke of a "*positive Greek-Turkish agenda*" that he would implement if he were re-elected Prime Minister, while Mr. Filis said that "*a new policy should be drawn up, as proposed by SYRIZA, on the model of the Prespa Agreement, a policy of mutual cooperation and understanding... with the peculiarities of Turkey. An understanding that will end up in the Hague tribunal*". I wonder if these are the positions adopted by the newly elected President of SYRIZA?

Similar statements were made by N. Bakoyannis, E. Venizelos and the reappearance of G. Karatzaferis, while the American Ambassador J. Chounis, at the 8th Delphi Economic Forum, spoke about

the need for *"a sincere effort on both sides to make significant progress in Greek-Turkish relations"*.

Shortly after the June 2023 national elections, and with the

"air of 41%", Prime Minister Mitsotakis announced that an agreement with Turkey *"may imply some concessions from certain positions, which may be the starting point of a negotiation"*. Asked whether the negotiation includes a **reduction of sovereignty** as we know it today, he said that ***"this is a relative concept"***.

Already, after the first meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Ankara, Mitsotakis and Erdogan in New York, and additional meetings at various levels, the "Athens Declaration" has arrived. But in the end we do not know what they are discussing, we do not know what they will decide in utmost secrecy without the people knowing. The practice of secret Greek-Turkish diplomacy was officially adopted in 1976, when, following a crisis in Greek-Turkish relations, the "Bern Protocol" was signed, in which it was agreed that *"this negotiation is, by nature, strictly confidential"* and *"the two parties agree that **no statements or leaks should be made to the press on the content of the negotiations**"*.

negotiations, unless otherwise decided by common accord"
¹. Who knows today what the subject of the negotiations with Turkey is? No one. Not even Parliament.



1. The protocol ceased to apply as Turkey backed out of the decision to go to The Hague.

Defeat or deterrence?

In the face of Turkey's aggressive policy, Greece is called upon to resist in order to be able to survive and prosper. Unfortunately, in the implementation of our foreign policy, views are being adopted that advocate respect for Turkey's sensitivities and size and the need to make an "agreed retreat", which in practice will be an agreed humiliation.

opponent, in the hope of avoiding or delaying the conflict by military means. For this reason, its supporters often blackmail with the dilemma of '**negotiation or war**', which is, however, highly deceptive and false.

"Appeasement" is not a guarantee of peace, but a temporary postponement of an inevitable conflict or a reversal of the status quo. **Historically, it has been shown that Turkey understands and respects only the language of power.**



7.12.2023: The Greek Foreign Minister Gerapetritis bows, during his statements, to the President of the Hellenic Republic.

And this is where we should direct our national effort.

At the same time, the false view that Turkey is strong and we cannot fight with it is being promoted as a form of intimidation. But reality and history prove them wrong. A people must, if it wants to remain great and strong, be able to survive.

free, able and determined to fight for the national cause.

This "**theory of counter-insurgency**" is in reality a policy of

unilateral concessions to a

interests. *"Free the cheerful"*.

The case is reminiscent of the blackmailing dilemma put to the Cypriot people for the adoption of the Annan Plan in 2004. At that time, all known Greek politicians were blackmailing public opinion and scaremongering that the rejection of the plan would supposedly cause the recognition of the pseudo-state and the amnesty of Ankara for the occupation of the territory of an EU member state. The only serious answer to the catastrophism, i.e. 'NO', was given at the time by the late, last political hero, Tassos Papadopoulos, with a fiery proclamation, comparable to the ancient oath '*I will not surrender my country*'.

The role of ELIAMEP

ELIAMEP (Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy) is an independent, non-profit organisation that produces research, ideas and policy proposals on European and foreign policy issues. It is funded by research programmes and studies, as well as by the private sector. ELIAMEP systematically develops novel theories, misrepresenting or suppressing data, which are ultimately inconsistent with national interests. The fact is that its members are often hosted in the media and create a trend which, paradoxically, is also followed by the government and its spokespersons.



Some of unlikely views published in July 2023 on his website on the forthcoming negotiations with Turkey are rather shocking:

- "*Greece persists in projecting **maximalist** values and*

The European Union is *not allowed to make actions of dubious legitimacy in zones of sovereignty.*"

– "To put aside all that **has poisoned** bilateral relations and all that has threatened peace and security, making the use of natural resources inefficient and endangering the well-being of their citizens."

– "The persistence of various **national myths** in both countries have derailed any attempt at meaningful dialogue that could lead the two nations to settle their differences on the basis of mutual benefit."

– "**The two countries' insistence** on exploration and drilling for hydrocarbons is seen as **misguided and outdated**, involving geopolitical competition to secure control of fossil fuels rather than prioritising **the fight against the common environmental and climate threat.**"

– "Releasing gas into the sea **can have serious environmental consequences.**"

These positions are already being disseminated in various articles and statements by professors and journalists, in an attempt to "create a climate". Whether the Greek people subscribe to the above views is anyone's guess. The dangerous thing is that these views are also expressed by the politicians who negotiate our national interests.

What the International Law of the Sea provides

It is natural in a negotiation that everyone invokes international law as a guide and basis for discussions. But what exactly is this and what does it concern us?

The most important development that enshrines our sovereign rights in the Aegean Sea came after long negotiations at the UN, with the signing of the **United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)** in 1982 in Montego Bay, Jamaica, which entered into full force on 16 December 1994. To date, 168 countries have ratified the Convention and most of its articles are **customary (universal)** and European law, i.e. it is binding on



all States of the international community, whether or not they have signed and ratified the Convention. The importance of the UNCLOS Convention for the interests of Greece is enormous, since it is the only means, in an international context, by which our country, and consequently Cyprus, can assert its interests by taking the initiative.

Some of the most important points of the Convention that concern us and are also customary law, binding on states that are not parties to the Convention, are:

Territorial sea or Aegean Sea

Article 2: *"The sovereignty of a coastal State extends beyond its continental territory and internal waters... to the adjacent maritime zone defined as the territorial sea. This sovereignty shall extend to the airspace above the territorial sea as well as to its seabed and subsoil".*

Article 3: *"Each State shall have the right to determine the extent of its territorial sea. Such breadth shall not exceed 12 nautical miles measured from baselines established in accordance with this Convention.*

NOTE: The extension of territorial waters is our undeniable right, it does not require any kind of negotiation.

and can be implemented directly by a simple legislative act.

Article 15: *"Where the coasts of two States lie opposite each other or border each other, neither State shall, in the absence of an agreement between them to the contrary, be entitled to extend its territorial sea beyond the median line all points of which are equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each of the two States is measured."*

Innocent passage (innocent passage)

Article 17: *"Subject to the conditions of this Convention, the vessels of all States, whether coastal or landlocked, shall enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea"* (elsewhere it is stated that the passage shall be in accordance with the rules of international law and of the Coastal State).

Exclusive Economic (EEZ)

Articles 55-57: This is the area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea extending up to 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.

Article 56 *"In the EEZ the coastal State shall have:*

(a) sovereign rights aimed at the exploration, exploitation, conservation and management of the natural resources, whether living or not, of the overlying waters of the sea-bed, the sea-bed and its subsoil, as well as other activities for the ecological exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the extraction of energy from the waters, currents and winds.

(b) jurisdiction, relating to the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and devices, marine scientific research, the provision and preservation of the marine environment".

Article 74: *"The delimitation of the EEZ between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be carried out by agreement on the basis of international law as defined in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, with a view to reaching an equitable solution. If no agreement is reached within a reasonable , the States concerned shall have recourse to the procedures provided for in the Convention.*


Continental Shelf

Article 76: *'The continental shelf of a coastal State shall consist of its seabed and subsoil extending beyond its territorial sea throughout the entire extent of the natural extension of its land territory up to*

of the outer limit of the shelf or at a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer limit of the shelf does not extend to that distance.

Article 121: *'The territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty applicable to other continental areas. Rocks which cannot support human habitation or their own economic life shall not have an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.*

Note: Article 121 is mainly what Turkey does not accept, because it gives jurisdiction over all the Aegean islands. Also under the UNCLOS Convention the concept of continental shelf has been superseded by the EEZ, since the continental shelf is included in the EEZ. Turkey deliberately refers only to resolving the issue of the continental shelf, which also includes technical issues relating to the configuration of the seabed, which are difficult to understand. In the case of the EEZ, however, the delimitation is simply based on the 'median line' principle.



Sovereignty of the Aegean Islands. What the Treaty of Lausanne provides for

Turkey, as part of ongoing claims, disputes Greek ownership of 153 small islands in the Aegean Sea, claiming that they have an unclear status and are not included in the relevant concession treaties. Its aim is to raise additional issues in the current negotiations and thus blackmail the adoption of solutions in line with its interests. But the Lausanne Convention is clear and precise. It was signed on 24 July 1924 between Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Greece, Romania and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on the one hand, and Turkey on the other.



Article 12 confirms the sovereignty of Greece over the islands of the Eastern Mediterranean, except for the islands the islands of Imvros, Tenedos and Lagos (south of the Dardanelles) and the islands as far as

3 nautical miles from the Asian coast. **All the rest are Greek**, regardless of whether they are not mentioned by name.

In addition, in Article 15 of the same Treaty, Turkey renounces in favour of Italy all rights to the Dodecanese (including Castellorizo) and the islands dependent on them. **For this reason, Turkey very often speaks of a review of the Lausanne Treaty.** However, the Treaty is not open to revision or amendment in any way. All of its provisions form the solid institutional and political foundation of Greek-Turkish relations, not only in terms of their mutual relations, but also in terms of other individual issues, such as that of minorities in the two countries. What is won with blood and struggle cannot be given away with ink and paper.

Άρθρον 12.

Η Ληφθεΐσα απόφασις τη 13η Φεβρουαρίου 1914 υπό της Συνδιασκέψεως του Λονδίνου εις εκτέλεσιν των άρθρων 5 της Συνθήκης του Λονδίνου της 17/30 Μαΐου 1913, και 15 της Συνθήκης των Αθηνών της 1/14 Νοεμβρίου 1913, η κοινοποιηθείσα εις την Ελληνικην Κυβέρνησιν τη 13 Φεβρουαρίου 1914 και **αφορώσα εις την κυριαρχίαν της Ελλάδος επί των νήσων της Ανατολικής Μεσογείου, εκτός της Τμβρου, Τενέδου και των Λαγουσών νήσων (Μαυριών), ιδία των νήσων Λήμνου, Σαμοθράκης, Μυτιλήνης, Χίου, Σάμου και Ικαρίας, επικυρούνται, υπό την επιφύλαξιν των διατάξεων της παρούσης Συνθήκης των συναφών προς τας υπό την κυριαρχίαν της Ιταλίας διατελούσας νήσους, περί ων διαλαμβάνει το άρθρον 15. Εκτός αντιθέτου διατάξεως της παρούσης Συνθήκης, **αι νήσοι, αι κείμεναι εις μικροτέραν απόστασιν των τριών μιλίων της ασιατικής ακτής, παραμένουσιν υπό την τουρκικήν κυριαρχίαν.****

"Madrid Agreement of 1997

It is a standard tactic of Turkey to create incidents and crises and to use the psychological effect created to gradually promote its aspirations.

Shortly after the 1996 Imia crisis and after a months-long behind-the-scenes process and pressure from the then US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Turkish President Suleiman Demirel and Greek Prime Minister Kostas Simitis, in a joint communiqué issued on 8 July 1997, stated that the two countries would undertake efforts to promote bilateral relations based on:

1. Mutual commitment to peace, security and the continued development of good neighbourly relations.
2. Respect for the sovereignty of each country.
3. Respect for the Principles of International Law and the Transnational Agreements.
4. Respect for the **legitimate, vital interests** of each country in the Aegean, which are of great importance for their security and national sovereignty.
5. A commitment to **avoid unilateral actions**, on the of mutual respect and the desire to avoid conflicts due to misunderstanding.

6. A commitment to settle disputes by peaceful means, on the basis of mutual consent and **without the use or threat of force**.

These commitments are used indirectly by many Greek politicians, but also by various internationalists and experts (e.g. ELIAMEP) in order to support the need for a negotiation with Turkey. The 'agreement', although it is considered to be of limited legal validity ², since it is not even signed, has been violated by Turkey itself, although this not been denounced by Greece.

Turkey's violation of the Agreement is related to the threat of war (*casus belli*), the adoption of the "Blue Homeland" doctrine, the signing of the Turkish-Libyan Memorandum, the arbitrary name of the Greek Aegean Sea as Turkaegean, the illegal extension of its jurisdiction over half of the Aegean for matters of research and development (S&R), the claim of **"undefined sovereignty" of Greek islands and the conduct of illegal research** within the Greek continental shelf/ABZ in the Aegean. Finally, Madrid gave Turkey the right to consider its illegal claims as "vital interests".

2. "Greek-Turkish Relations" PATAKI Publications, Feb 2015, by Angelos Syrigos

Declaration of Athens 2023

Following the Madrid Agreement is the "Athens Declaration", signed on 7 December 2023, after months of secret backroom negotiations between the Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis and Turkish President Erdogan. The reason for the new agreement was Turkey's provocative action with the ocean-going vessel Orus Reis and the crisis that followed between Greece and Turkey in the summer of 2020, similar to the Imia crisis, which was the trigger for the Madrid Agreement. Turkey's pattern of action remains the same.

- The Declaration, as it explicitly states, "does not constitute an international agreement binding on the parties under international law. Nothing in this Declaration shall be construed as conferring any legal rights or obligations on the Parties."
- The government of the New Democracy signed the "Athens Declaration" without having ensured the condemnation and removal of all illegal and aggressive policies on the part of Turkey. That is, the threat of war (casus belli), the adoption of the doctrine of "Blue Homeland", the signing of the Turcolivian Memorandum, the arbitrary name of the Greek Aegean Sea "Turkaegean", the illegal extension of its jurisdiction over half of the Aegean Sea for issues of ResearchTurcolivian Memorandum".

rescue (S&R), the claim of "undefined ownership" of Greek islands and the conduct of illegal research within the Greek continental shelf/AEZ in the Aegean.

- Therefore, statements such as that of Dora Bakoyannina, that the declaration "has no legal value, but it has political value" as it "contains all Greek positions", are empty; political value will only emerge if Turkey respects the Law of the Sea and stops its threats.
 - The Declaration includes the following decisions which give rise to legitimate concerns as their application:
 - OP1(c) : "Measures in the military sector that would contribute to the elimination of unjustified sources of tension and the risks arising from them"
- (NIKIS note: will it be about demilitarization of islands; will it be about Greek fighter aircraft flying in national airspace?)*
- OP2 : "The Parties undertake to refrain from any action, initiative or activity that undermine or discredit the letter and spirit of this Declaration or endanger the maintenance of peace and stability in their region."

(NIKIS' note: But Turkey has not withdrawn the casus belli that threatens peace. Who will determine what threatens peace? According to Turkey, the issues that could undermine peace are the extension of our territorial waters to 12 miles, the closure of the bays, the request for recognition of 10 miles of airspace, the return of military material to the islands, etc. We are therefore denying ourselves sovereign rights for the sake of peace, while Turkey promises ... not to make aggressive statements. In essence, this is a self-limitation of Greece's sovereign rights).

- OP3: "The Parties shall endeavour to settle any dispute arising between them amicably through direct consultations between themselves or by other means of mutual choice as provided for in the Charter of the United Nations."

(NIKIS' note: We are thus satisfying a Turkish demand to avoid internationalisation of Turkey's behaviour unilaterally by Greece (through the UN, EU, NATO, allies).



Peace and respect for Greek rights in the Aegean were won with struggle and blood, not granted by the ink of goodwill declarations by Turkey.

Cyprus and Greek-Turkish relations

On 12 December 1988, Cyprus ratified the Convention on the Law of the Sea and in February 2003 and January 2007, Cyprus signed an agreement on the delimitation of its EEZ Egypt and Lebanon, respectively. The agreement is based on the internationally accepted principle of the "median line" and the terms of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. This was followed in December 2010 by the signing of an agreement between Cyprus and Israel on the delimitation of the EEZ between the two countries. On 16 February 2007 Cyprus launched the first round of applications for hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation licences and permits.

Small Cyprus has moved forward and will start reaping the benefits of its choices. Greece when?

There are views in Greece that want the Cyprus settlement process to be detached from the Greek-Turkish negotiations, while there are also actions by Athens that show that we want Turkey to be more satisfied than Cyprus. A prime example was the acceptance at the NATO meeting in Vilnius in July 2023, following a Turkish proposal, of the inclusion of Cyprus on NATO maps not as a country name but as a "space".

with coordinates. Another example is Greece's support for a Turkish candidate, instead of the Cypriot candidate, for the Secretariat of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO).

"Those who make allegations of Athenian-Lekosia disharmony in the handling of the Cyprus issue are being stigmatised by the government. But other statements, such as those of Christos Rozakis, a professor and former Deputy Minister of the Simitis governments, who suggests that the Cyprus problem should be set aside in favour of resolving the Greek-Turkish differences, are ignored by the government.

The continued occupation of Cyprus is the biggest problem in Greek-Turkish relations and its solution should remain our main objective. It is good for the Greek Prime Minister to go to the American Parliament and be applauded, but our allies should also support Greece in this matter. But it seems that our foreign policy has many hidden commitments that are an obstacle to solving the problems.

On the contrary, Turkey is maintaining tension in the Greater Island. Most recently, in August 2023, it tried to

the blatant illegal expansion of the occupied territories in the settlement of Pyla in Larnaca, with incidents and injuries to UN cyanocrats. It is also pressing ahead with the increased flows of illegal immigrants into free Cyprus through the occupied territories. Unfortunately, the EU, with the support of Greece, is responding to the instrumentalisation of the migration issue with new general subsidies to Turkey or possibly even the abolition of the VISA requirement for Turkish citizens to enter border points on Greek territory.

Hellenism in Greece and Cyprus must not overlook (either out of naivety or out of the desire of our allies) the recent problematic behaviour of Turkey, because this behaviour will only get worse. The recent uprooting of the Archenians of Artsakh from their ancestral homes has shown this. History teaches us that when we forget, it repeats itself.

Complex of Megisti (Kastelorizo)

Key to the delimitation of the Greek EEZ is the island of Kamchatka, which, although it is located about 120 km east of Rhodes and just a few km from the Turkish coast, no one can dispute that it has an EEZ. The important thing is that on the basis of the 'median line' principle, the Kastelorizo complex

ensures the contact between the Greek and Cypriot EEZ. This significantly limits the Turkish EEZ in the Eastern Mediterranean. **Kastelorizo is the apple of Turkey's eye.**

It can easily be concluded that it should be a basic strategy of Greece to develop in every way the economic development of both Kastelorizo and the adjacent small islands of **Strongyli** and **Roe**, in order to mark in the best way the easternmost tip of Greece, which gives us important sovereign rights.



What applies internationally to territorial waters

Worldwide, 186 countries with a sea have extended their territorial waters to 12 nautical miles and most of them have declared an EEZ of up to 200 nautical miles. Among the few exceptions (only 7 countries) is Greece, which has 6 nautical miles in the Aegean Sea and only in 2021 extended its territorial waters in the Ionian Sea to 12 nautical miles.


Turkey maintains 6 nautical miles in the Aegean, but has extended its territorial waters in the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean to 12 nautical miles since 1964.

What we gain from the exploitation of the EEZ and territorial waters

The extension of our territorial waters to 12 nautical miles will almost extend our sovereignty in the Aegean Sea (from 43.5% to 71.5%). Also, the declaration and delimitation of the EEZ under the Law of the Sea gives us an area of about 482,000 square kilometres in which we can exercise sovereign rights in matters of fishing and, most importantly, the exploitation of energy deposits such as oil and gas.

But what is the total value of the potential deposits? Since we are unlikely to hear this from Greek ministers, let's look at some figures for other Mediterranean

countries.



Egypt in 2021 had reserves of 65 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, with an estimated value of €400-500 billion. Israel has proven reserves of 35-40 trillion cubic feet and Cyprus 13-14 trillion.

According to Antonis Foskolos, professor emeritus of the Technical University of Crete and researcher at the Geological Survey of Canada, only within the southern area of the Greek EEZ there are estimated to be 55-60 billion barrels of oil, worth 4.5-5 trillion dollars at today's prices.

It is also planned to pass through the Greek EEZ:


- The **EASTMED** pipeline to transport low-carbon hydrogen from Israel, Cyprus and Greece to Europe, and
- The electrical interconnection between Greece, Cyprus and Israel through the **EuroAsia Interconnector**, which is a European Project of Common Interest (PCI 3.10) in cooperation with the Independent Electricity Transmission Operator of Greece (ADMIE) and will be funded by the European Union.

The above projects will provide in Greece a

geopolitical and geo-economic advantage, while also implementing the EU's long-standing strategy of energy decoupling.

Turkey is aware of the wealth hidden in the Aegean and the Southern Mediterranean and of course it is doing everything possible to seize it. For this reason, island disputes are also being raised, up to and including the claim to Gavdos, which provides significant property rights because of its position.

Conclusion: Both the Aegean and the Southern Mediterranean have many hidden treasures waiting to be exploited. And the legitimate question is: What are we doing to exploit them?



What Turkey has done on the delimitation of the EEZ

Turkey's interest began on 1 November 1973, when it granted a licence to a Turkish oil company to carry out exploration in Greek areas of the Aegean, while in 1974 and 1976 a Turkish oceanographic vessel carried out further exploration in the Aegean. Tensions arose and a memorandum of understanding was finally signed in Bern (11 November 1976) until the matter was referred to the International Court of Justice. Turkey eventually withdrew and the protocol ceased to apply.

In March 1987 he again attempted to conduct research outside the coastal zone of Greek islands, with the research vessel SISMİK, which was accompanied by Turkish warships. Similar events took place in 2020. In all cases, a crisis was provoked and the armed forces were mobilised.

Turkey, although it neither signed nor ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, established an EEZ in the Black Sea around the end of 1986 and came to an agreement with the then Soviet Union, using the middle line method. It soon began talks with Bulgaria and Romania on the same issue and reached a similar agreement. Thus, while Turkey has proceeded to cooperate with Black Sea states in the delimitation of the

EEZ in the Black Sea, Turkey has also made progress in the delimitation of the Black Sea.

The European Union a "closed or semi-enclosed sea" like the Mediterranean - refuses to do the same in the Mediterranean.

It should be noted that no candidate country can become a member of the European Union unless it has also acceded to the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea. However, Turkey signed an Association Agreement with EU in 1963, which allows it to participate in many financial programmes.

When in 1995 Greece ratified the Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Turkish National Assembly voted into law the so-called "casus belli" which is a direct **threat of war** if Greece extends its territorial waters beyond 6 nautical miles. It should be noted that according to the United Nations Charter, Article 2 (4) ⁽³⁾, the threat of the use of force is prohibited, while the UN Security Council may, according to Article 39, take measures to maintain the security of the country.

3. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

the maintenance of international peace and security.

At the same time, it proclaims that it wants to create an AEZ in the Mediterranean, by promoting the doctrine of the "Galician Homeland", which covers half of the Aegean Sea. In practice, an attempt is being made to revise the Lausanne Treaty to the east and to the detriment of Greece. In this project, Kemalists and Islamists of the AKP are involved.

Turkey considers that due to the alleged peculiarity of Aigaios, the Greek islands should have up to 6 nm of space.

They are not entitled to a continental shelf and EEZ, because due to their proximity they are a natural extension of Asia Minor and sit on its continental shelf.

On the basis of the above allegations, it also made the so-called Turcolibian Memorandum, which is beyond any legal correctness and geographical reality, since it ignores the existence of Greek islands such as Rhodes, Karpathos and Kassos and Crete.



Since 2019, Turkey has adopted the doctrine of the Blue Homeland (MAVİ VATAN), claiming that all islands, even those the size of Cyprus, Crete and Rhodes, do not have an EEZ, but only territorial waters.

If Kanaris were alive today, instead of replying, he would send them pieces of the torched Turkish flagship as a souvenir.

What Greece has done for the delimitation of the EEZ

Greece ratified the Convention on the Law of the Sea on 23 June 1995.

In a declaration to the International Court of Justice in The Hague in 1994, it recognised its jurisdiction as compulsory, while in a new declaration on 14 January 2015, it excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court matters relating to the protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity from the point of view of national defence and disputes concerning the limits and extent of its territorial waters and airspace.

We never negotiated with Cyprus. A few years ago the Cypriot side approached the Greek government and asked them to proceed with the delimitation of the two states' EEZ, but unfortunately Greece did not seize such a great opportunity that would have created a precedent, not only for the Castelorizo complex, but would have created a permanent maritime border with Cyprus.

An important step in support of our sovereign rights was the passing of **Law 4001/2011** (Maniatis Law) concerning "Production and Transmission Networks of Hydrocarbons"; in article 156 it states that "In the absence of a delimitation agreement with neighbouring states whose coasts are adjacent or adjacent to ours, the

The outer limit of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone (once declared) is the median line, each point of which is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines (both continental and island) from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.



Today, why are we not talking about this law?

In practice, by declaring an EEZ, even if Turkey, Libya and Egypt do not agree to its delimitation, we can take advantage of the fact that we have an EEZ.

We will leave anything within our land and sea territory, e.g. between Crete and Gavdos.

We only reached an agreement with Italy on the EEZ on 9 June 2020, but due to pressure to sign it, we granted Italy the right to fish within the Greek EEZ and up to 6 nautical miles from our coastline, as well as reduced EEZ overlap in the Greek islands of the Trans- overseas islands, north of Corfu.

In the same year, on 6 August 2020, an agreement was signed with Egypt for the delimitation of part of the EEZ, in which the Greek government accepted a reduced influence on the Greek islands. This position is identical to the Turkish position on "proportionality", abandoning the principle of the "middle " for the delimitation of the maritime zones. Also according to Article 1(e) of the Agreement, *"If either Party conducts negotiations with a view to delimiting the EEZ with another State sharing with both Parties their maritime zones, that Party shall, before reaching a final agreement with the third State, inform and consult with the other Party"*. So anything we do with Cyprus will have to be approved by Cairo.

International Organizations present Greece's EEZ according the International Law of the Sea and not based on Turkish claims

If Greece agrees to proceed with the delimitation of its EEZ with Egypt and/or Turkey without the full influence of Kastelorizo and the small island of Strongyli, this will result in Greece not having a natural border with Cyprus.

The agreements with Egypt and Italy were not made on the basis of the framework of European law, the value of which will be demonstrated below.

It should be noted that the delimitation of the "European Exclusive Economic Zone" in accordance with the provisions of the Convention on the Law of the Sea is a prerequisite not only for the 'economic vitality' of the EU, but also for its own national prestige.



Do we disagree with the Greek-Turkish dialogue?

Dialogue between states is generally a legitimate process and should not be avoided. In practice, however, because it is a political negotiation with serious future consequences, it should be conducted on equal terms, on the basis of international law and the mutual interests of the two states. There are examples where even belligerent countries negotiate and agree on issues of mutual interest, as was the case between Israel and Lebanon on the delimitation of their EEZ.

Also in a dialogue, if we want it to be honest and productive, the past should not be pardoned. We should remember that Turkey has a past of genocide, invasion and occupation of Cyprus, treaty violations (for the autonomy of Imbros and Tenedos), violation of UN resolutions, threats, violations and more. Therefore, we should not naively accept Turkish claims in the debate, but should confront the Greek positions as well.

Greece and Turkey have been negotiating the Aegean Sea since 1976. Since then, Turkey's demands have been increasing continuously, with the obvious aim of exerting psychological pressure to find a solution to 'defuse' the tension between the two states. Also since 1982 we have not been able to exercise our sovereignty

our rights under the Convention on the Law of the Sea over Turkey's objections. It is logical that this **process must come to an end**.

In the dialogue, Turkey seeks to impose its unilateral illegal demands without recognising both the International Law of the Sea, which is customary law - i.e., it becomes binding even on states that have not ratified it - and the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in The Hague and Hamburg, because they are not compatible with its domestic law and interests. On the contrary, it will try to avoid having its claims referred to an International Court of Justice and will seek a political solution. **This is the dangerous part of the negotiations.** The Greek Government, under pressure from the international community, the need to show tangible results, but also due to defeatism, is likely to agree to a restriction of our sovereignty and sovereign rights.

In this political negotiation, one single difference should be considered: the delimitation of the EEZ/shelf. **Nothing else.** If there is no agreement, then the dispute on this particular legal issue should be referred to the International Court of Justice, as provided for in the 1982 Law of the Sea Treaty - if, of course, Turkey so wishes.

To which International Court of Justice do we appeal?

The recourse to an international court should be based on its jurisdiction and procedures governing it, while the content of the parties' petition or agreement is also very important in order to seek the opinion of the court. But who are these courts?

International Court of Justice The Hague - International Court of Justice (ICJ)

It is based in The Hague, the Netherlands. Article 36(1) of its Statute states that the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice shall extend to all matters

provided for in the applicable treaties and contracts. In practice, it deals with "legal disputes" submitted by States.

Such cases are usually brought before the Court of Justice by means of a written application to bring an action. It is a unilateral document which must state the subject-matter of the dispute and the parties (Article 40(1)) and as far as possible, specify the provision on which the applicant seeks the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice (Article 38).



International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea - ICLOS (ITLOS).

It is based in Hamburg, Germany, and was established 1994 following the activation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Article 287). It consists of 21 judge members elected from a list of nominees proposed by UN member states.

Court of Justice of the EU - CJEU (CJEU). Located in Luxembourg. It is a purely legal court with European judges. It ensures that the law is observed in the interpretation and application of the Treaties and its judgments are enforceable in accordance with Article 28^o of the Treaty on the Functioning of EU (TFEU).

Its decisions politically and legally binding on EU member states, but also on associated members such as Turkey since 1963 and Albania since 2009. It assesses the legality of the acts of the EU institutions, ensures that Member States comply with their obligations under the Treaties and interprets EU law at the request of national courts.

Since June 1998, with the EU's ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention as a European

law and the formal written declaration to the UN Secretary General, the jurisdiction of the Court is recognised for matters requiring the interpretation and application of the Law of the Sea Convention as European law.



Is it dangerous to go to The Hague?

The dominant narrative of the negotiations is the prospect of resolving the Greek-Turkish disputes on the basis of international law by recourse to the Hague (ICJ). Greece recognises a single dispute with Turkey, that of the delimitation of the EEZ. The settlement of this dispute should be based on legal and not political terms.

However, the practice of the ICJ shows that it also takes into account political considerations, but also the principle of "equity ¹⁾" for the formulation of a judicial decision, a position that Turkey desperately wants and which may be particularly negative for our country.

Turkey has also not recognised the general compulsory jurisdiction of the Hague Court and therefore the referral of a legal dispute requires a special agreement (a "co-contract"), which will form the legal basis for the proceedings. With Turkey we tried to go to the Hague in 1976, but in the end, during the process of drafting the co-contract, it backed out.

It is therefore estimated that Turkey will agree to the pre-

to the Hague, or another court, only if there is a prior political agreement in which its claims are met. In this way, recourse to the Court will be presented to public opinion as a legitimate settlement of disputes with mutual respect for international law, with, of course, the appropriate media support. And this will of course be seen as a great success, or at least as a win-win situation ².

In conclusion, we can say that referring the issue of the delimitation of the EEZ to The Hague will be ineffective. **If the delimitation ends up in the International Court of Justice, without specific conditions, it will be very dangerous for Greek interests. For this reason, it is essential that the agreement with Turkey should specify that the dispute will be pursued on the basis of the provisions of the Convention on the Law of the Sea; issues of sovereignty, defence of the Greek islands in the Aegean and the extent of territorial waters should not be brought before the court.**

An appeal to the ICJ (or another court) with the

1. A vague and misleading principle for cases where the common law is considered inflexible and cannot fairly resolve a disputed legal issue.

2. An agreement in which both sides win.

conditions that Turkey will set, will increase the intensity of its claims against Greece (very) if we show that we are a phobic nation towards it. Simply put, *"our objection to The Hague is not about our lack of respect for it as an international legal institution, but reflects our strong concern about the prospect of its use as a binding mechanism for irreversible and purely heterobaric concessions by Greece to Turkey on the basis of false artificial expectations of a shaky future peace and false stability between the two sides of the Aegean, and especially in the East and the West. For us, this should unquestioningly include Cyprus, which, especially in the current geostrategic environment, cannot be removed from the equation of Greek-Turkish relations"* ³.

What else can Greece do? EU involvement in the EEZ definition process

Despite our good intentions in the so-called "window of opportunity", Turkey is not expected to accept any political agreement on the delimitation of the EEZ, unless its unreasonable demands are met. It is also estimated

that it will not accept a referral to The Hague or even more so to Hamburg, if the dispute in question should be decided on the basis of the International Law of the Sea and under the conditions mentioned above (Greek statement of 14 January 2015). Will the delimitation issue never be resolved?

Greece and Cyprus are members of the European Union and should seek solutions and "tools" within Union law to support their sovereign rights. The EU Court of Justice (CJEU) in Luxembourg could also be a very worthwhile solution⁴ which should be duly considered by the Foreign Office.

In the first instance, Greece and Cyprus should demand that the European Union should join in the process of delimiting their EEZ with that of Turkey (the third state). Turkey, if it is sincere in its desire to resolve the issue, should agree to this cooperation throughout the process, given the international standing of the European Union and the fact that Turkey has had an Association Agreement with it 1963.

3. Mazis Ioannis, Professor Emeritus <https://www.militaire.gr/i-mazis-gia-ellinotoyrkika-parathyro-eykairias-i-parathyro-ethnikon-parachoriseon/>

4. Relevant information is contained in the doctoral thesis of Doctor of Laws Georgios Anthrakes, presented at the Athens Bar Association <https://www.youtube.com/live/IsDkBoiFbaA?si=2Kpo2obGGvVfGtSp>

What else can Greece do? Take an independent initiative using the EU

In case Turkey does not accept the EU's cooperation in the negotiations on the delimitation of the EEZ, Greece should take the initiative, as follows:

α. Complaint of *casus belli*

Firstly, to appeal to the competent EU institutions, denouncing Turkey for the threat of war that it has declared since June 1995 (*casus belli*) in case of a possible extension of our territorial waters. The action can be brought on the basis of the provisions of the 1963 EU-Turkey Association Agreement (Article 25(2)) in order to examine whether it is compatible for a country (Turkey) with which there is an Association Agreement with the EU to threaten an EU Member State with war. It should be noted that under the existing EU Association Statute, Turkey has so received very substantial financial support.

In the same way, Cyprus can also take legal action against Turkey for the illegal invasion and occupation of 37% of the island.

β. Referral to the Court of Justice of Luxembourg (CJEU)

Greece and Cyprus have a pending boundary-

of their maritime zones since 2003. Instead of a political agreement, which would be difficult to reach, they can appeal to the EU Court of Justice in Luxembourg, by way of a compromise and on the basis of the International Law of the Sea, for the Court to give an opinion on the delimitation of the maritime fishing and energy zones between them. The neighbouring countries concerned (Turkey, Egypt) will also be informed of this appeal and will be able to make their views known.

Once the pleading is filed, there will be no possibility of overriding or duplicate interventions/appeals; in any case, the Court will give a final decision on the matter. Its decision will be taken without political considerations, in a purely legal context, and will concern the application of the Law of the Sea Convention, on the basis of the Treaties which define the current framework. It will also have the support of the EU itself and of its members, which cannot de facto oppose its interests. It should be stressed that most of the EU countries are coastal countries and are therefore subject to the obligations and rights of the above Convention.

The Court's ruling will constitute a strong legal precedent, binding both EU Member States (e.g. Italy) and those countries with candidate status, such as Albania and Turkey. In practice, the candidate countries will be asked to decide whether they want their membership perspective and the economic benefits that go with it.

It should be noted that European law takes precedence over international law, in terms of the conflict of laws within the EU. As a result, the agreements that Greece has politically accepted with Italy and Egypt can be amended by taking them to the EU Court of Justice in Luxembourg. In addition, any discussion of a memorandum of understanding with Turkey, which already has no validity, will de facto cease as being unsustainable.

An appeal to the EU Court of Justice in Luxembourg is perhaps the best solution for the peaceful settlement of the delimitation of the EEZ, where Greece and Cyprus will take the initiative. Turkey will be faced with the dilemma of "**accepting European law or isolation**" and will have to decide whether it really wishes to become a member of the European Union.



The positions of NIKE

A. Clear explanations and no half-truths from the government

- The Government should clarify to the Greek people with what strategy and with what lines it is approaching the negotiations with Turkey. The Greek people must know what is being discussed.
- The issues of sovereignty and sovereign rights of Greece are not under negotiation. No Government is authorized to cede sovereignty and sovereign rights.
No more "Prespa" type betrayals.
- The National Council for Foreign Policy should be reopened so that the parties can be effectively informed about the strategic planning of our foreign policy.
- The Prime Minister should publicly declare that the exercise of our legitimate sovereign rights under the Law of the Sea does not constitute "unilateral" actions and that we are not bound by the 1997 Madrid Agreement, since

has been violated by numerous unilateral and illegal actions by Turkey in the Aegean Sea (a relevant question has been submitted by NIKI to the Greek Parliament).

- We agree with the official position of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs¹ that *"the issue of delimitation of the EEZ/shelf is only between the opposite coasts of the Greek islands opposite Turkey and the Turkish coast"*. Nowhere else. This delimitation should be based on the 'median line' principle. We reject unequivocally outdated principle of 'fairness' and 'proportionality' that Turkey seeks as the basis for delimitation of the EEZ.

B. To make use of all our rights in the European Union and the UN

Demand the involvement of the European Union in the process of delimiting the EEZ between Greece, Cyprus and Turkey. In case Turkey refuses to participate in the EU sponsored negotiations, then Greece:

1. <https://www.mfa.gr/zitimata-ellinotourkikon-sheseon/eidikotera-keimena/oriothetisi-yfalokripidas.html>

- To denounce Turkey to the EU for the threat of war it has declared since June 1995 (casus belli) on any extension of our territorial waters and to ask for an investigation into whether it is acceptable a country (Turkey) with which there is an Association Agreement with the EU to threaten an EU member state with war.
- An agreement with Cyprus to bring a case before the EU Court of Justice in Luxembourg, jointly and on the basis of the International Law of the Sea, to decide on the pending delimitation of their maritime boundaries on fisheries and energy issues.
- Based on the Court's decision and the current Law 4001/2011 to exercise its sovereign rights with regard to fishing and the exploitation of its energy deposits.
- In the UN, the Greek Government must without delay denounce to the UN the practice prohibited Article 2 para. 4 of the United Nations Charter, so that the Security Council may take appropriate measures, as provided for in Article 39 of the Charter, to maintain peace and security in the region.
-

C. To define an EEZ in accordance with the International Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)

To make use of the inalienable right to **extend our territorial waters to 12 nautical miles**, as provided for in the International Law of the Sea, with all the necessary preparatory actions at every level, **before the designation of an EEZ**. We must not accept any retreat on this issue, nor consent to discuss it anywhere. Any agreement to deviate from this constitutes **an act of disobedience**.

If the current Greek Government insists on the solution of resorting to The Hague or another arbitration tribunal to resolve the delimitation of the EEZ/shelf area, the relevant co-contract with Turkey should at least state that:

- The adjudication of the matter will be based on the provisions of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea.
- Turkey respects Greece's sovereignty over the Aegean Islands and such a matter will not be considered by the Court.
- Greece's declaration of 14 January 2015 on the exclusion from the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of matters relating to the defence of islands and territorial waters remains in force.

D. Shield our Aegean Sea in every way possible

- The strengthening of our country's Armed Forces, both in terms of personnel and new weapons systems, so that they can reliably defend our sovereign rights, is a one-way street for Greek strategy. This reinforcement should not be seen as a loss of resources that could be allocated to other sectors, such as social welfare, health or education, but should be seen as a return on the ability to exploit the rich energy deposits in our EEZ.
- The activation of our hundreds of rocky islets with renewable energy generator installations makes them not only visitable and habitable, but also economically viable. They are therefore of increased geostrategic importance, but also of increased defence value.
- Strengthening our defence self-sufficiency and the essential coverage of our basic operational needs by a domestic defence industry is indispensable. Our dependence on third parties is a serious risk. To the same end, we should not give away a single sling of our arms to third countries. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict, during which even weapons from the early decades of the Cold War were unearthed, is a source of great concern to us.

This is proof that ammunition sufficiency based on "expected conflict duration algorithms" is a science fiction scenario for ministry bureaucrats who do not expect to be called to the front line.

- Last, the most essential: The mental preparation and educational shielding of the Greek citizen-citizen-citizen. The crucial element is the first of all, a full-scale defence throughout the Aegean and the border regions, the cultivation of national unity and unanimity, the emphasis on education based on the values of our ancestors. The heart that moves the hand that holds the gun.

E. Greece and Cyprus: two States, one nation.

A decent President of the Republic had said that "we are an abominable nation". The unification of the forces of Hellenism at every level must be a National Strategy of Greece. This will be achieved through the exploitation of the Greek-Cypriot OEZs, the strengthening of the unified defence doctrine, a multidimensional policy of deterrence, alliances, smart armaments, the development of domestic defence industry, and the cultivation of a nationwide conscience capable of cancelling out Turkish threats. Hellenism should also be able to defend its sovereign rights militarily.

Epilogue

We did not inherit our homeland from our parents, but borrowed it from our children. Its borders are non-negotiable. Ormenio in the North, Gavdos in the South, the island of Othoni in the West and Kastelorizo in the East, define a strong and unique Greece.

A Greece that is blessed by God and has many comparative advantages, such as natural beauty, unique coastlines, rich deposits and minerals, tradition in seafaring, trade, science, arts and many more. But it also has an unparalleled Greek Orthodox tradition, history and language, which makes it a cultural superpower. All this should be taken very seriously by those in power when negotiating our national interests.

The power of Hellenism, the power of Romanism is very great and under certain conditions it can grow.

In the near future, we will all be called upon to take a position on the decisions to be taken in the Greek-Turkish negotiations and this will show how true patriots we are. Citizens and politicians.




ΑΝΔΡ
ΠΑΣΑ

**"We are
indebted to those who have
come, passed, will come, will
pass.**

**Judges, we will be
judged by the unborn,
the dead."**

Kostis Palamas



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